HARRY R. CARTER, Ph.D., MIFireE

Many times during my years as a firefighter and officer, I saw the face of death. Sometimes it bore the face of a stranger, and sometimes it was a friend or fellow firefighter. Sometimes the death occurred as a result of fire in a blazing building. At other times it was a result of the insidious work of smoke and carbon monoxide. And in still other cases, it was caused by chemical, mechanical, or electrical energy.

There was a common thread in of these deaths. They occurred as a result of forces or circumstances that were considered beyond the control of the fire department. Whether it was in Newark or Adelphia, rare was the time that we were in full control of the circumstances of an evolving emergency. But was the consideration of chance in each of these instances properly warranted. Could not a greater devotion to the issue of safety eliminated the need for a gathering of massed firefighters at a tear-stained memorial venue.

Recently a brother fire officer from the state of Delaware died in the line of duty. Such an event is always a tragedy. There are the loved ones left behind. There is the young widow left to find her way in life. There is the loss of unfulfilled future promise. And there is the child who is forced to grow to adulthood without the strong supporting and protecting arm of Dad to guide and point the way.

All of these things were driven home to me on Thursday May 4. As my good friend, Dr. Bob Fleming and I were returning from the Fire Service Congressional Caucus Dinner in Washington, DC, we stopped at Greenwood, Delaware to pay our respects and represent the International Society of Fire Service Instructor at the funeral of Assistant Chief Arnold Blankenship, III. The message of what a lost life means was once again driven home. I left Delaware with a renewed commitment to preach the gospel of training safety.

What takes this man’s passing to the level of more than a mere tragedy is the fact that it occurred during a training evolution. Haven’t we been through all of this before? Have we not learned from the tragic lesson of Boulder, Colorado? What about the deaths in Milford, Michigan? And how about the near miss in Parsippany, New Jersey back in 1992?

Before I go one step further in this commentary, I want to make one point abundantly clear. I am not here to point fingers or assess blame. That is not what I am about as a writer and lecturer. I have never been one to do that. I have long known that the hunt for witches is always a futile waste of time and energy. There will be investigations, and I know that my good friends in Delaware will give a true and honest account of the why, and wherefore of this tragic occurrence. My sole purpose for creating this commentary is to prevent the next death, or the next injury.

All of the information to do this is already in existence. The National Fire Protection Association’s (NFPA) Standard 1403, Live Fire training Evolutions in Structures, was created to set the standard for live fire evolutions. A bit of history order at this point, because many of our current firefighters and chiefs were in high school or grammar school when the Boulder, Colorado Fire Department lost three of its members in a locally-initiated live fire exercise back in 1982. A number of critical issues were identified at that time that became part of the NFPA 1403 Standard that governs live fire evolutions. The initial release of NFPA 1403 came in 1986.

In 1992, Tim Bradley, Deputy Commissioner of Insurance in North Carolina, highlighted his opinions in a 1992 Fire Chief magazine article on safety in acquired structures. He stated that NFPA 1403, "… was meant to establish a safe standard of conduct while conducting live fire evolutions."

I firmly agree with his assessment.

Some of the critical elements, as I remember them from the Boulder incident were:

1. Inadequate hose streams
2. Materials that were too flammable and should not have been used to start, fuel, and propagate the fire
3. Lack of a water supply
4. Lack of safety procedures
5. Lack of backup staffing at the exercise

I paid a great deal of attention to the findings of the Boulder investigation. At the time I was the President of the New Jersey Society of Fire Service Instructors. More importantly, I was also an instructor on the staff at the Newark Fire Department’ Training Center. We were involved in a number of live fire exercises at that time, as were many other cities around the state, and throughout the nation.

At that time, there were a large number of abandoned buildings in the city, and we frequently conducted training burns within them. Sometimes things went well, and sometimes you could say that we were lucky. I can remember being singed on a couple of occasions. I guess the fact that I survived a few instances of being stupid qualifies as hard-earned experience. Many beliefs that I held about live fire evolutions were tried and found severely wanting. Many of those dumb things coincided with what became prohibitions under the standard.

When NFPA 1403 was published, we worked hard to bring our operation into conformance with their requirements. It was not always easy to comply, given our shoestring budget, but we did alter our operation to meet the appropriate requirements.

All went well in our nation until 1987. The Milford, Michigan Fire Department was conducting a live fire drill at an acquired structure in their community. A number of lives were lost when the training fire roared out of control. Later investigations found that many of the same errors that had been at the root of the Boulder tragedy were also part of the problem in Milford.

The findings of the Milford investigation made their way to the NFPA 1403 committee and were fully reviewed. They then made their way into the next revision of the standard. One of the interesting point that emerged from the investigation was that Fire Chief in Milford had no knowledge of what the NFPA 1403 standard was, or what it recommended. I thought, at the time, that we should have been beyond that, but I was proven wrong.

Once again I was proven wrong in 1992. In December of that year, three fire personnel from the Parsippany, New Jersey were severely burned in a live fire training incident that was conducted in a school bus at the local sewerage plant. One of the three individuals lingered near death for many days, but survived with a number of severe permanent disabilities.

There was one big difference in this instance. I became directly involved in the investigation of this case. My services were retained by the Morris County Prosecutor’s Office to conduct an investigation of the incident. I was charged to identify any lapses in good training practices. I found a list of items that mirrored what is recommended in the NFPA 1403 standard.

Some of the points that I uncovered were:

1. Flammable materials were in use.
2. There was no source of water supply
3. The initial attack line was too small
4. The was no safety officer
5. There were not enough instructors
6. There were no back up attack and supply hoselines
7. There was no EMS on location
8. Many people lacked adequate protective equipment
9. There was no command structure

This incident led to the passage of New Jersey legislation that mandated a number of important changes in how live fire training is conducted. It is very difficult to obtain permission to conduct a live fire exercise in an acquired structure. Each application for a live-fire training exercise permit is thoroughly reviewed by the State Division of Fire Safety. Some are approved some are not. In general, most live-fire training is now conducted at approved training facilities.

Just a few weeks before the Delaware tragedy, four firefighters were burned during a live fire training exercise in Kentucky. I have yet to see any in-depth report issued as to how this incident occurred. I look forward to a sharing of the critical data in that case.

The point of this article is that this past week’s tragedy should never have occurred. The live-fire training and safety knowledge has existed for nearly two decades in written form. Something went badly wrong

Let us all join our fellow firefighters in Delaware in morning the passing of Assistant Fire Chief Arnold Blankenship, III. Let us also vow to widely share the reasons for this tragedy. It does no one any good to sweep the result of an investigation of this magnitude under the proverbial carpet of fire service secrecy. We owe this dedicated man’s family the promise that his death will not have been in vain. Let us learn all we can from this loss. Please.

The commentary in this column does not necessarily reflect those of Firehouse.Com, Firehouse Magazine, their employees or parent company Cygnus Business Media. Harry R. Carter, Ph.D., MIFireE, is an internationally known municipal fire protection consultant and contributing editor to Firehouse Magazine. He recently retired as a Battalion Commander with the Newark, New Jersey Fire Department. His commentary appears regularly on Firehouse.Com. For more commentary and information, visit Carter's web site at www.harrycarter.com Harry has published several books available for online ordering, including Firefighting Strategy and Tactics and Management in the Fire Service