In the summer of 1998 the Prince George's County, Maryland Fire and Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Department completed a series of training opportunities at the 13-floor, Park 16 Apartments in Oxon Hill, Maryland. The Department of Housing and Urban Development turned the building over to County authorities, when the building fell into a state of disrepair. For over a year and a half, the police and fire departments, as well as numerous outside agencies, conducted extensive operations in the building.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Park 16 apartment building was a 13-floor 'Y' shaped hi-rise, with two floors below grade from the front. Designed and built from 1967 to 1969, the 210-unit building was an upscale, 'out-of-the-city' address. Over the years the neighborhood deteriorated and living conditions in the building became unacceptable. The address was eventually taken over by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). HUD was unable to rescue the building, and turned it over to Prince George's County for disposition. County Executive Wayne Curry seized this opportunity to continue rehabilitating the deteriorated inner-beltway communities. County Executive Curry, with the final intention of razing the structure, turned the building over to the Prince George's County Fire Chief, Ronald J. Siarnicki.
ORGANIZATION OF TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES
Working with the County's Housing office, the County Police Department was able to conduct extensive forcible entry and K-9 dog training in the building. The Fire Department took over, and completed the buildings demise. Chief Siarnicki tasked me with developing a comprehensive training and evaluation plan.
The permit process consisted of NFPA 1403 compliance with utility company sign-offs, the County Health Department inspection for hazardous conditions, and Fire Department acquisition of an "open-burn" permit.
The first wide spread mindset that needed change was, "we can't do that", not only from the practical standpoint, but also from a legal stance. Having coordinated many acquired structure burn exercises over the years, it is clear to me that nothing is impossible (some just harder than others). The next mindset to change was "the large number of injuries from burning inside a concrete building will far outweigh the benefits this project can give us."
The Fifth Battalion station officers, Captains Hayden, Fusco, and Brown, and Lieutenants Sudik and Bartholomew were asked to assist with the development and preparation for this massive undertaking. It was clear that a tremendous amount of off-duty time would be required from this organizing body to make the project successful. Organizational and development duties were broken into five main areas:
- Organization and Admin. - B/C Bashoor
- Logistics - Lt's Bartholomew & Sudik
- Safety Considerations - Captain Hayden
- Evaluations - Captain Brown
- Instructor Scheduling - Captain Fusco
Assisted by Deputy Chief William McGown, this group proceeded to organize and implement what would be recognized at the time as the 'largest known live fire training exercise in the United States.'
BUILDING/SITE PREPARATION
The building was vacated by human residence approximately a year and a half prior to acquisition by the Fire Department. There were minimal contents available to simulate realistic conditions. Due to the lack of certain on-site resources, a full compliment of administrative help would be necessary to accomplish our main goal; real time, real life, meaningful training, with meaningful feedback.
The building sprinkler system had been vandalized extensively and was not salvageable. After the sprinkler valves were shut off, a small leak in the standpipe siamese supply pipe was easily repaired. Although the fire pump was not operational, there was a 700 g.p.m. private-hydrant, supplied by a six inch feeder, 75 feet from the building siamese.
The 12-inch supply pipe at the main road supplied approximately 5000 g.p.m. The 'instructor supply line' (secondary water source) was supplied from this main. A single 3-inch supply line was run from the road, across the parking lot, then up the side of the building. This was a total length of approximately 400'.
Testing proved the hydrant pressure sufficient to supply two 2" lines (1 fog, 1 straight tip) at 60 p.s.i. nozzle pressure, flowing on the tenth floor from the center core, 100' to each stairwell. The 3" line was secured by a rigging arrangement at a coupling at the 5th floor window, then again at the 10th floor.
The line entered the 10th floor (the maximum height we chose to operate at due to rubber roofing) and proceeded through open pipe chases to the 8th floor. The 8th floor was approximately central to the average location of our most common operating location. At the 8th floor, a gated wye divided the flow to a 2" line with a straight tip, and a 1¾" line with a fog nozzle.
Those lines then ran through the pipe chases, positioned by the on-site instructors, to the floors of operation for any given day. There was always one charged instructor line on the fire floor and on the floor above.
The original rental office on the first floor, wing 1, was secured and established as office space. Instructors knocked down walls between two apartments on the first floor, wing 3, to form a classroom/meeting/rehab area. The entire wing 3, specifically the end apartment from the 1st floor to the 11th, was designated as a 'safe' area for participants and instructors.
Due to previous asbestos removal, corridor and apartment unit wall holes (large enough to walk through) required patching. While there were closet doors left in the building that facilitated some patching, the County supplied drywall for the remainder.
The electric company was called to isolate power to the administrative and safe areas by physically cutting and removing wiring from the remaining units, then re-energizing the building. The phone company established phone service in the office area for two lines. A personal computer was acquired, and general office supplies ordered. The basement area of the building yielded several discarded desks and shelving that, after brought upstairs, were used in the office area.
The office areas worked very well, with several glitches handled on an 'as happened' basis. Smoke and water travel through pipe and electrical chases, while anticipated, became overwhelming at times in the office area. Patching holes above and opening holes below quickly helped with the water travel. Smoke travel, however, reacted differently every day, depending on the weather.
General cleanup and housekeeping was a continuous operation. Two dumpsters and three 'porta-johns' were obtained for our on-site use. For safety and identification purposes, fire-line tape and barricades were used to isolate particular areas of concern.
MATERIAL ACQUISITION AND PLACEMENT
The biggest logistical challenge became the ready acquisition of suitable 'burn' materials. Pallets, while available, were not readily attainable in the quantities we would need to sustain a large-scale operation. On numerous occasions we hitched trailers and went on 'fishing' expeditions.
While the local landfills were reluctant to separate materials or allow us to scavenge discarded couches, Fred Sanford had nothing on our ability to pickup curbside throwaways. The 'American Rescue Workers' provided a major supply of donated, but damaged furniture. Using 'light duty' and local station personnel, furniture was loaded onto the Fire Department's stake body truck and transported to a collection area at the western side of Vermillions parking lot.
We sent requests over the station printers for donations of materials and assistance. As the word spread, pallets began to arrive at a steady pace. First they came by pick-up truck, then tractor trailer. In all, four tractor trailers, two 'beer' trucks, and several roofing trucks brought loads of pallets for our use. Most companies participating also supplied as much materials as they could muster.
This truly became a 'community' project. One duty the 'executive assistant', Fire Fighter Kevin Clements, was responsible to coordinate was the orderly and strategic placement of materials as they arrived. Materials were placed into the building using a wood platform hoisted by tower ladders to an entry on each floor. The average weight of a loaded platform was 350 lbs, well below the 600 pound hoist test weight. To prepare for the final event, a crane sped the loading of over 400 pallets to the 7th and 8th floors. Materials were moved in the parking lot using a forklift rented from a local rental company.
ADVERTISEMENT AND INVITATION
The internal communication network within the Fire/EMS Department served as notification to our members. Deputy Chief McGown, as a participant with the Metropolitan Council of Governments, opened the exercises to local participation. This invitation, while fruitful, proved the most taxing of administrative functions. Without the aforementioned administrative setup, coordination of the 'mutual aide' effort would not have been possible.
The Department committed from the beginning that the project was to be soley coordinated through the organizing members. This ensured that all requests to participate were funneled through a single source, with no commitments prior to consultation with the calendar.
While the Public Information Officer (PIO) would normally have been an integral part of such a project, I don't believe any of us fathomed the magnitude the project would eventually take on. The PIO, Mark Brady, was brought in and successfully handled all media inquiries and invitations. During the three-month process there were two 'press days', which were covered on a National level.
Additionally, the Discovery Channel and the Learning Channel film crews from Los Angelos and London, England, filmed extensive portions of upcoming 'firefighting' series, including rescue and hi-rise firefighting segments.
Over 30 workers, Volunteer and Career, continued construction and organizational activities as advertising at an intra-departmental level progressed. After five (5) weeks of physical preparation, we were ready to begin.
TRAINING PLAN IMPLEMENTATION
The opportunities the building presented are probably endless. Considering the time of year, spring/summer, and time constraints based on the planned building demolition, the organizing instructors, including Captain Jerry Lamoria from the Fire/EMS Training Academy, decided on one 'large scale' basic scenario.
Approximately 15 individual topics were advertised including ladders, forcible entry, search and rescue, elevator emergencies, cutting torch, building construction survey, rapelling, collapse work, sprinkler/standpipe, and others. Using baled 'excelsior' from the Fire/EMS Training Academy, flares, pallets, and discarded furniture, the instructors and other workers set-up apartments for training sessions.
One of the local television stations purchased carpeting and interior finishes to furnish a living room for specific public safety filming opportunities. Apartment 504, which became known as the "press apartment", was chosen based on the low level of repair necessary to film in the apartment.
Utilizing our established network of certified and knowledgable instructors along with their internal experiences, each request for training was paired with a suitable, available instructor. At least one of the organizer instructors/workers would be on the site for any scheduled session or event. The 'gatekeeper', as they became known, was the on-site coordinator or person-in-charge for the day. Minimum instructor saturation was determined as follows;
- NON-IDLH atmosphere (1 or 2 company) 1 instructor
- IDLH, one-floor (1 to 3 companies) 4 instructors
- IDLH, two-floors (4 or more companies) 7 instructors
Potential instructor assignments consisted of;
- On-site Coordinator
- Instructor-in-Charge (IIC)
- Safety 1 (Fire floor supervisor)
- Instructor 1 (Fire floor)
- Igniter 1 (Fire floor)
- Safety 2 (Floor above supervisor)
- Instructor 2 (Floor above)
- Igniter 2 (Floor above)
Other designations were made on an as needed basis.
Communications was facilitated by utilization of an off-channel on radios that the Department had purchased for special events. Each instructor and position of responsibility was equipped with a special events radio. This allowed participating companies to use the normal Fire Department 'fireground' channels, while instructors used the other radios.
Captain Fusco was responsible to ensure the appropriate level of instructors was scheduled for each event. Several on-duty instructors were used when last minute changes required additional assistance. A dry-erase command and control board was developed which proved extremely helpful in delineating areas of responsibility.
Before each day or segment of instruction, all of the instructors would gather in the converted rental office to receive the instructors safety briefing, which was given by the instructor-in-charge (IIC). The specific details of the evolutions and areas of evaluation were developed and discussed here. Safety was always the overriding concern. Instructors had explicit authority to remove personnel or halt situations as they saw fit. This authority was employed on three occasions.
Evaluation sheets, which were originally developed by Captain Brown, became impossible to complete and maintain in the atmospheres and conditions we produced. Immediately following evaluated evolutions, the instructors gathered again in the briefing room to go over the observed performance.
After the companies rehabbed, everyone reported to the classroom where the IIC conducted a thorough debriefing and critique. Unit officers were given the opportunity to explain procedures or actions that may not have fallen in the acceptable criteria category. This format proved beneficial as ideas were shared and lessons were learned.
The original intent we envisioned for this project was to provide 'hi-rise' training. Using the BOCA code hi-rise definition of 75', it was decided that hi-rise evolutions would occur from the sixth floor up. The type I construction meant the 'burn from the top down' theory was of minor concern.
Instructors and workers were constantly stocking rooms for the 'next' evolution or the following days events. We were careful to stock our supplies away from direct heat/flame impingement. Although we found auto-extension quickly broke and allowed glass to fall, the pre-evolution safety instructions and perimeters set up proved extremely effective in the prevention of injuries and damage.
TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES
The opportunities were only limited by our imagination. The following bullets give a brief description of the activities undertaken during the three months of operation;
- Live fire as well as search and rescue training on all 13 floors by 19 jurisdictions, covering 4 states, the District of Columbia, and 6 military installations.
- Baker Life Chute evacuation demonstration (Sliding to the ground through a net affixed to the roof). The United States Park Police Helicopter assisted by lifting the awkward equipment to the roof.
- Regional Collapse Team drill. This involved demolishing a portion of non-bearing wall, confined space work and application of shoring techniques.
- National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) fire model testing. Four apartments; two 3-bedroom and two 2-bedroom units (each identical in arrangement), were completely refurbished, including drywall and paint. Identical furnishings were purchased for like apartments. Sprinklers were installed in one of the 2-bedroom and one of the 3-bedroom units. Thermal couplings and other sophisticated monitoring equipment was brought in to facilitate 'live' fire model testing. To their knowledge, this level of extensive fire model testing in an actual building had never been accomplished prior to this event.
- On-going Fire Fighter I class brought in for overhaul and breaching work.
- The Hazardous Material Team conducted Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) simulant disbursement testing, as would occur in a terrorist attack. Monitoring equipment was used to track air movements through the building. Containment and suppression techniques were practiced and evaluated.
- Fire Investigators field work, including PGFD investigators, the International Association of Arson Investigators (IAAI), the Maryland Arson Investigators (MAI), the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), and the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI).
- Filming with most local television stations, The Learning Channel, The Discovery Channel, and the Memphis Fire Museum.
- Field testing of several thermal imaging devices.
- Testing use of interior master stream devices in a simulated office environment. The rear section of wing 2 on the 2nd floor was demolished, except for bathroom and kitchen enclosures.
- FEMA search dog training; locating victims.
- High Angle Team rapell training, victim removal.
- Bomb Squad terrorist activity training.
- Tower ladder work. Four towers operating simultaneously to extinguish a well-involved fire showing in 36 windows.
LESSONS LEARNED...
PHYSICAL TRAINING
We found that the demand placed on a Department by true hi-rise firefighting was taken for granted by most of the Departments that participated, including our own. While some were better prepared than others were, most personnel and their supervisors had an eye opening experience during these exercises. The importance of physical training programs can not be understated, as was consistently demonstrated at our facility. Those participating in a regular program of exercise were generally able to travel four floors farther, of double tiered steps, than those that did not participate in an exercise program.
STAFFING LEVELS
Engine companies with three-person staffing levels found themselves ill-prepared to mount an aggressive attack or search after the two-person interior crew had lugged all of their equipment up six, seven, eight, or nine flights of stairs. While three-person crews may be adequate for the typical EMS or service call, we found it completely inadequate at Vermillion Avenue. Additionally, three-person crews prevent immediate compliance with OSHA 2-in, 2-out requirements.
RAPID INTERVENTION CREW (RIC)
Departments need to focus on improved implementation of RIC's and their strategic placement. As a part of that focus, our Department is currently re-training each member in RIC and 'save your own' techniques. Unit officers must understand the importance of communicating with the Incident Commander (IC), as that may relate to the IC's decision to initiate RIC activity, especially in such large and compartmentalized buildings as this.
We conducted potential RIC deployment evolutions on every multi-company operation. In all cases where a RIC was deployed on the floor below the fire, and employed upon receipt of a distress signal, 'missing' members were located within two minutes.
ACCOUNTABILITY
Accountability procedures, while generally followed at the Command Post, were much less definitive on the fire floors. Some crews were observed communicating constantly, while others made no communication at all. Instructors pulled members found operating alone to a safe area. In most cases, members found operating alone had momentarily separated from a partner to perform some other 'quick' function.
These 'members in distress' were then instructed to activate whatever mechanical method was at their disposal to signal distress. Where partners were utilized, one partner found the other in all but one case. In approximately half of the cases, the unit officer was completely unaware of a crew members disappearence. In some cases, activation of the automatic or manual alarms yielded no response of any kind.
When queried later, members indicated they just passed off the noise as another mistake or malfunction. In two cases, members were not found yet were reported as accounted for upon a post IDLH accountability check. This was a clear indication of the slack attitude and lack of appreciation or understanding some of our personnel have towards true accountability procedures.
COMMUNICATIONS
The ability for members to communicate effectively in such a large building, while important was nearly impossible. Our Department's high-band radio system provides two unit-to-unit operating channels. With crews operating on multiple floors, those two channels became inadequate quickly.
On many occasions, other incidents or radio traffic were already occurring on the two channels, creating significant confusion. We are currently working on specifications for an 800-Megahertz system, which should alleviate this problem. Unit officers must remember, however, to limit radio traffic to that absolutely necessary.
Some Department's supplied each member with a radio or communicating device and trained those members to use them appropriately, making the flow of information better and increasing the level of accountability.
EMS SECTOR or 'AIDE STATIONS' - While most Department's have policies for EMS sectors or aide stations, only a few companies or Department's had clearly defined and developed procedures for EMS crews to enter and establish medical staging areas on floors below the fire. Part of the 'Recommendations to the Department' is to develop a training module to familiarize every member with the actual establishment and maintenance of a functional EMS sector and staging area.
TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES
Small, generally inexpensive packaging equipment (eg: wheeled carts with compartmentalized areas) greatly improved the crew performance, and reduced fire fighter stress. Crews that utilized this type of equipment and/or a regular, systematic trade-off of carrying responsibilities (instead of one person trying to make it all the way) had improved performance, including a quicker attack on the fire and less member fatigue.
COMMAND & CONTROL
Although this building did not have a fire control room, very few of the command officers inquired as to the possible location of a fire control room. Such rooms with interconnected intercom and paging systems, as well as telephone access and alarm-monitoring capabilities can be invaluable to the IC's successful mitigation of an incident.
It was extremely difficult for the command officer to make strategic decisions without good communication from their unit officers. Most command officers became wrapped up in the evolution and failed to recognize early signs of member fatigue, or make early provisions for relief crews. The command officers usually took good, strategic positions for their command post, with abandonment of the command post only once being an issue. Unit officers should remember to touch base with command before they enter the building.
When the command officer or his/her assistant had physical contact with the unit officers prior to entering the building, the command officer had a much better handle on who was supposed to being doing what, and where they were supposed to be. Where crew freelancing occurred, the command officers were clearly not in-control, and were left with a high level of frustration.
BUILDING CONSTRUCTION & ENVIRONMENT
The building took on its own weather characteristics from day to day, fire to fire. We had the unique opportunity of observing downdraft and horizontal smoke and fire movements, even on lower floors, under somewhat controlled circumstances. Typically, strong winds blowing from the South would hit the rear of the building causing a downdraft that would completely invert the flame and smoke from a raging fire.
The pressure gradients allowed the inverted thermal column to be rapidly drawn in to open windows as far as three floors below the fire floor. The type I characteristics held the buildings structural integrity extremely well. Participating members had the opportunity to watch and observe varying levels of spallded concrete. Open pipe chases leading from the basement levels to the roof, produced swift convective currents, carrying smoke throughout the building.
Fire spread through these pipe chases was a real problem, which was monitored closely by instructors. Steel apartment doors held well if completely closed, but failed early under a fully involved living room fire where the door was not completely closed. Stairwell doors held very well, but presented significant smoke travel channels, when held open by standpipe hose lines or other equipment.
It was not unusual for smoke to travel horizontally for several hundred feet before presenting itself to the outside, on the other end of the building. Where stairwell doors were left open, it was not unusual for smoke to be issuing from five or more floors at a time. Instructors had to pay particular attention to accountability and safety when these conditions existed.
SEARCH & RESCUE
Approximately 2/3 of the apartment searches were cursory at best. Every multi-company evolution involved an 'obvious rescue' of a rescue manikin. While everyone keyed on the obvious, few performed a thorough search of the fire and adjacent areas, as should have been done.
One evolution involved a firefighter in full protective clothing, lying in a bathtub. The bathroom was 'searched' three times, reporting negative results each time. The individual was not found until instructors terminated the exercise. Personnel must remember that civilians, particular children, will use bathrooms, closets, cabinets, or other enclosed areas as their first and possibly last place of refuge.
Large numbers of civilians should be expected to fill the stairwells, possibly hampering fire department personnel access. A building of this size and construction type may require an isolate and save in place tactic. Other than apartments directly adjacent to the fire unit, both vertically and horizontally, closing their doors and staying in their apartments may best save occupants. Truck and Rescue Squad Companies must remember hi-rise fire history.
A significant number of injuries and deaths have occurred very remote from the original fire location as smoke and toxic gases travel vertically through the upper floors. Command and company officers must remember to ensure that full primary and secondary searches are completed on upper floors, which may be remote from the fire location.
THINKING OUTSIDE THE BOX
While it is certainly necessary for personnel to work with discipline and consistency, personnel must also recognize the times they will have to think and act 'outside the box'. Some of our evolutions required personnel to do just that. For the most part, people knew what to do, but some did not know how to do it.
'Everybody' knows what to do when a Fire Department siamese is out-of-service, but personnel consistently demonstrated that most were ill prepared to perform this task in a reasonable time frame. Additionally, only a few personnel considered flying standpipe operations, even with the ladder truck directly in front of or behind their engine.
One fully involved living room fire presented a particular crew with a challenge. Due to the proximity to an exit stairwell, the officer chose to connect to an alternate riser. Unfortunately this brought the crew short of the apartment door, with all spare hose used.
The crew retreated to the adjoining apartment, made a small breach in the tenant separation, inserted the nozzle and extinguished the fire. Moving to the adjoining apartment was a particularly good tactical move. A failure of the entire tenant separation, would have left the hallway still tenable for retreat. A total wall collapse while breaching the hallway separation would have compromised their escape.
CONCLUSION
The opportunity to use a 13-floor apartment building for live-fire training over a 3-month period is one that most firefighters will never have. Simply thinking of this as 'just another house burning', would be a terrible mistake. We had the fortune to work closely with over 100 Volunteer and Career instructors from around the region. The lessons learned, while important for our departments, were more significant for the individuals having the opportunity to participate.
For the sake of every fire and EMS member and the citizens we serve, we should all use this experience to examine our level of preparedness, further our safety and improve the level of protection we provide.
I encourage all members to seek out opportunities that you may think are unattainable. County Executive Wayne Curry and Fire Chief Ron Siarnicki, along with all of the support staff, were key to this projects success. The right combination of knowledge, experience, and support will carry and teach you, as far as logical imagination will take you.
